The 2020 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition- Memorial for Respondent by unknown
197R
IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE
NETHERLANDS
THE 6 13T PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2020
CASE CONCERNING THE HELIAN HYACINTH
THE STATE OF ADAWA
APPLICANT
V.
THE REPUBLIC OF RASASA
RESPONDENT
MEMORIALfor the RESPONDENT
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................183
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................................................... 198
QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................................................................199
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................... 200
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS...............................................................203
PLEADINGS............................................................................................205
A. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ADAWA'S
CLAIMS BECAUSE ADAWA IS NOT A PARTY TO THE 1929
TREATY OF BOTEGA......................................................................205
L Adawa has not automatically succeeded to the Botega Treaty....
.................................................................................................. 205
a) AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION IS NOT PART OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ................................................................... 205
b) ALTERNATIVELY, THE INTERTEMPORAL RULE PRECLUDES THE
APPLICATION OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION .................................. 206
II. Adawa did not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of a
territorial regime .............................................................................. 207
a) THE BOTEGA TREATY DOES NOT ESTABLISH A TERRITORIAL
REGIME BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA ..................................... 207
(i) Adawa does not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of
Article 1(2) ............................................................................... 207
(ii) Adawa does not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of
Article 3(1) ............................................................................... 208
178
Distinguished Brief
b) ALTERNATIVELY, ADAWA SUCCEEDS ONLY TO THE TREATY
PROVISIONS WHICH ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL REGIMES ............... 208
III. Adawafailed to obtain Rasasa's consent to become party to the
Botega Treaty ................................................................................... 209
a) RASASA HAS NOT TACITLY CONSENTED TO ADAWA'S
SUCCESSION TO THE BOTEGA TREATY ......................................... 210
IV. The jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty cannot be
invoked as a ground for jurisdiction ............................................... 210
B. RASASA'S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE
WALL ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN ADAWA AND
RASASA IS CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW ..... 211
L The deployment of the WALL is consistent with international
law .................................................................................................. 211
a) THE WALL'S DEPLOYMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE IL.........211
(i) Rasasa has to observe IHL due to the non-international
arm ed conflict...........................................................................2 11
(ii) The WALL complies with the rules of IHL ...................... 212
(iii) The WALL complies with the principle of distinction ..... 212
(iv) The WALL complies with the principle ofprecaution.....212
(v) The WALL complies with the principle ofproportionality....
......................................................................................... 213
(vi) The Martens Clause cannot render the WALL prohibited....
......................................................................................... 213
b) THE WALL DOES NOT VIOLATE HRL..................................214
(i) Adawa does not have standing to bring a claim regarding
the WALL 's deployment ........................................................... 214
(ii) Rasasa does not have extraterritorial obligations towards
Adawans ................................................................................... 214
2020 ] 179
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
(iii) Alleged violations of the right to life are determined by IHL
during an armed conflict .......................................................... 215
(iv) In any case, the WALL does not violate the right to life........
......................................................................................... 215
c) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR MEANINGFUL HUMAN
CONTROL OVER THE WALL ......................................................... 216
d) THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE BOTEGA TREATY ARE NOT
VIOLATED......................................................................................217
II. Adawa is barred from objecting to the development of the
WALL under the clean hands doctrine...........................................218
C. ADAWA'S CLAIM THAT HELIAN TARIFFS IMPOSED BY
RASASA VIOLATED THE CHC TREATY FALLS OUTSIDE
THE COURT'S JURISDICTION OR IS INADMISSIBLE. IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS DID NOT
VIOLATE THE CHC TREATY ....................................................... 218
L The Court does not have jurisdiction to examine this claim.......
.................................................................................................. 218
a) THE WTO PANELS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER
DISPUTES REGARDING HELIAN TARIFFS ....................................... 219
b) THE WTO PANELS' JURISDICTION IS LEXSPECL4LIS TO THE
ICJ'S JURISDICTION ...................................................................... 219
c) THE WTO AGREEMENT IS LEX POSTERIOR TO THE BOTEGA
TREATY ......................................................................................... 220
II. Alternatively, Adawa's claim is inadmissible.........................221
a) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LIS
PEND ENS......................................................................................-22 1




c) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS ....
............................................................................................ 223
III. The imposition of tariffs does not breach the CHC Treaty ... 224
a) THE TARIFFS ARE JUSTIFIED AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT
RASASA'S ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS ................................ 224
b) CONSEQUENTLY, ADAWA IS NOT ENTITLED TO
COMPENSATION.............................................................................224
D. ADAWA'S ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY
CONSTITUTE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, AND
SHE MUST BE IMMEDIATELY REPATRIATED TO RASASA .....
...................................................................................................... 225
I. Adawa violated Ms. Grey's immunities by arresting and
detaining her .................................................................................... 225
a) MS. GREY ENJOYS PERSONAL IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND
DETENTION UNDER THE CHC TREATY AND CUSTOMARY LAW....225
(i) Ms. Grey enjoys immunity under the CHC Treaty .......... 225
(ii) Ms. Grey has immunity under customary law ................. 226
b) ADAWA VIOLATED MS. GREY'S IMMUNITIES BY EXERCISING
DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OVER HER ............................................. 227
II. Adawa's violation of Ms. Grey's immunities cannot be justified
with its cooperation with the ICC....................................................227
a) THE ICC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MS. GREY ........
............................................................................................. 227
(i) The ICC does not have jurisdiction over nationals of non-
parties.......................................................................................227
(ii) Alternatively, Ms. Grey's immunities are a bar for the
jurisdiction of the ICC .............................................................. 228
2020 ] 181
182 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
b) ADAWA IS BOUND TO RESPECT MS. GREY'S IMMUNITIES EVEN
WHEN IT COOPERATES WITH THE ICC...........................................229
c) THERE IS NO CUSTOMARY RULE RENDERING IMMUNITY
INAPPLICABLE IN CASES OF COOPERATION WITH ICC .................. 230
III. Therefore, Ms. Grey must be immediately repatriated back to
Rasasa...............................................................................................230




Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in civil
and commercial matters, 1968 .............................................................. 221
Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1, UNTS XVI.................................225
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1984, UNTS vol. 1465................................221
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
1950, UNTS 213 ................................................................................... 221
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946,
UNTC 1, p. 15, and 90, p. 327.......................................................225, 227
Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 STAT.
2277, Treaty Series 539........................................................................217
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1A, 1994, UNTS 64....219
Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of
war, 1949, UNTS 759 ........................................................................... 211
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, INTS 999.............215
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994,
U N T S 186717, ............................................................................ 2 19,220
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Canada-Mexico, 1994, 32 ILM
289.........................................................................................................221
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts,
1977, U N T S 1125.................................................................................2 11
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts,
U N T S 1125 ................................................................................... 212, 213
1 832020 ]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
Reservations to the Optional protocol to the ICCPR, 1966, UNTS 999, p.
171, made by Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Iceland, Poland, Russia, Sri
Lanka, Turkey, Uganda.........................................................................221
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNTS 2187 ....... 228, 229
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, UNTS 1055.......210, 222
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, UNTS 500...............227
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of treaties, 1978,
UNTS 1946 ................................................................... 206, 207, 208, 209
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UNTS 1155......................
............................................................................... 210, 217, 220, 228, 230
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975,
A /CO N F.67/16 .............................................................................. 225, 227
WTO Agreement, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, 1994, UNTS
1869.......................................................................................219, 220, 222
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE DECISIONS
Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Order of 3 October 2018........................................................................219
Ambatielos case (Greece v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, ICJ
Rep 1952 ............................................................................................... 220
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1989
............................................................................................................... 225
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ........... 209
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kreda...205, 206, 207
184
Distinguished Brief
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2007..................................................205
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2007, Separate Opinion, Judge
Weeramantry ......................................................................................... 205
Application of the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 14 June
2019, ICJ Rep 2019, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cot.............................222
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for the
indication of provisional measures by the United Arab Emirates.........223
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), JudgementICJ Rep 2002 .............................. 218, 226, 227, 228
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgement ICJ Rep 2002, Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, Buergenthal........................................................................226
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2002, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Van den
Wyngaert...............................................................................................218
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1950 ..................... 206
Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India),
Judgement, ICJ Rep 1960 ..................................................................... 220
Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (France v. United States ofAmerica), Judgement, ICJ Rep...207
Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1963 ........................ 222, 223
Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France),
Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 2003, p. 102, Dissenting Opinion, Judge
de Cara...................................................................................................221
Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2019.................................223
2020 ] 185
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v.
France), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2008 ................................................ 226, 227
Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1949
............................................................................................................... 222
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada
v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1984 ...................... 210
Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) (1937), PCIJ
Ser A/B No 17, Individual Opinion, Judge Hudson..............................218
Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction) (1927), PCIJ Ser A
N o 9 ............................................................................................... 2 18,220
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland)
(Second Phase) (1930), PCIJ Ser A No 24............................................209
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Rep 1997 ...........
....................................................................................... 206, 207, 209, 218
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Rep 1997,
Memorial of the Republic of Hungary .................................................. 206
Immunities and criminal proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France),
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2018..................................................223
Island of Palmas, p. 870; Status of Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion)
(1923), PCIJ Ser B No 5.......................................................................228
Jurisdiction of European Commission of Danube Between Galatz and Braila
(Advisory Opinion (1927), PCIJ Ser B No 14......................................220
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep 2001
............................................................................................................... 217
Legal Consequences ofthe Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 2004 ................................. 215, 231
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep 1996 ....................................................................... 212, 213, 214, 215
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep 1996, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen...........................214
186
Distinguished Brief
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep 1996, Letter dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, together with Written Comments of the United Kingdom
............................................................................................................... 214
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2004..................................................217
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2004, Separate opinion of Judge Higgins
............................................................................................................... 223
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. UK) (Jurisdiction)
(1924), PCIJ Ser A N o 2................................................................214, 220
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
USA), Merits, ICJ Rep 1986..........................................212, 214, 224, 231
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
USA), Merits, ICJ Rep 1986, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Schwebel.....218
North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark, Germany v.
Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1969,................................................206
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Judgment, ICJ Rep 2003 ....................................................................... 224
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Rep
2010.......................................................................................................231
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (1928), PCIJ Ser
A No 1518 ............................................................................ 219, 221, 223
South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second
Phase, ICJ Rep 1966..............................................................................217
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa),
Second Phase, Judgement, ICJ Rep 1966 ............................................. 207
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), Judgement, ICJ Rep 2008 .................. 210
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Rep 2007 .............................................................. 207, 209
2020 ] 1 87
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, ICJ Rep
1994 ............................................................................................... 207,209
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. United States
ofAmerica), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1980.................................................231
INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS
Baena Ricardo and others v. Panama, IACHR, Series C 61, IHRL 1444,
1999.......................................................................................................222
Bankovi v. Belgium, No. 52207/99, [2001], ECtHR................................215
Busta and Busta v. Czech Republic, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Final Award, V 2015/014, IIC 928, 2017 ...... 221
Case concerning the Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France), Report of
International Arbitration Awards 1990, vol. XX (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3)
............................................................................................................... 231
Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (Preliminary objections,
merits and reparations) (2012), IACtHR ............................................... 215
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID, ARB/01/8,
Award 12 May2005 .............................................................................. 224
Coard et Al. v. United States, Case 10.951 (1999), IACHR, Report No.
109/99....................................................................................................215
Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 25781/94, [2001], ECtHR ..................................... 215
Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L. P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID,
ARB/01/3, Award, 2007 ....................................................................... 224
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment
and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claim, Partial Award, 19 December 2005
............................................................................................................... 213
European Communities - Regime for The Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, WTO, Appellate Body Report, 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, ¶204
............................................................................................................... 220
Hassan v. UK, No. 29750/09, [2011], ECtHR...........................................215
HRC, Trebutien v. France, Application 421/1990 .................................... 222
188
2020] Distinguished Brief 189
Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States ofAmerica), Reports of
International Arbitration Awards 1928, vol. II ..................................... 207
Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, 11.137 (1997), IACHR, Report N0 55/97
....................................................................................................... 211, 215
LG&E Energy Corp., L&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID, ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October
2006.......................................................................................................224
Loizidou v. Turkey, No. 15318/89, [1996], ECtHR ................................... 215
McCann v. the United Kingdom, No. 18984/91, [1995], ECtHR .............. 216
MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, PCA, 2003 .......
............................................................................................... 219, 221, 223
Nachova v. Bulgaria, No 43577/98, [2005], ECtHR.................................216
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, No. 48939/99, [2004], ECtHR ................................ 215
Pad v. Turkey, No. 60167/00, [2007], ECtHR...........................................215
Pauger v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, Application
16717/90, 1995......................................................................................222
Pey Casado and Foundation President Allende v. Chile, ICSID, ARB/98/2,
IIC 1347, Decision on the request for the stay of enforcement of the award,
15 March 2018.......................................................................................221
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Djibouti Decision, 2016, ICC-02/05-01/09-266 ......
............................................................................................................... 230
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, DRC Observations, Annex 2, 2014, ICC-02/05-
01/09-190-A nxII-tEN G ......................................................................... 230
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Jordan Appeal, 2019, ICC-02/05-01/09-397............
............................................................................................................... 230
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Jordan's Response to observations, ICC-02/05-
01/09-368 .............................................................................................. 230
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Malawi Decision, 2011, ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr
............................................................................................................... 230
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, South Africa Decision, 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09-302
...................................................................................................... 227, 229
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995), IT-94-1-A, ICTY
....................................................................................................... 2 1 1, 2 12
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (3 April
2008), ICTY .......................................................................................... 212
Prosecutor v. Kupreskid, IT-95 16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (14 January
2000), ICTY ................................................................................. 212, 213
Russia - measures concerning traffic in transit case (Ukraine v. Russia),
WTO, Panel Report, 2019......................................................................224
Southern Bluefin Tuna case (New Zealand-Japan, Australia-Japan),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Reports of International Arbitral Awards
2000, vol. XXIII....................................................................219, 220, 222
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WTO, Appellate Body Report, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R ........................ 223
United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO, Decision by the Arbitrator, 2017,
W T/D S381/A R B ................................................................................... 222
DOMESTIC DECISIONS AND STATUTES
Application for Arrest Warrant Against General Shaul Mofaz, First instance,
UK, Bow Street Magistrates' Court, 2004............................................227
Attorney General et al. v. The Kenya Section of the International Commission
of Jurists, Kenya, Court of Appeal at Nairobi, 2018.............................229
France, New Code of Civil Procedure ....................................................... 221
Gaddafi case, France, Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 13 March
2001, ILR, vol. 125................................................................................227
Germany, Code of Civil Procedure............................................................221
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act,
South A frica, 2002 ............................................................................... 229
190
Distinguished Brief
Independent State of Samoa, Act No. 26 on the International Criminal Court,
2007.......................................................................................................229
Italy, Code of Civil Procedure...................................................................221
Pinochet case, United Kingdom, House of Lords, Appeal, 1999..............226
Republic of Malta, Extradition Act, 1978 ................................................. 229
Sharon & Yaron case, Belgium, Court of Cessation, 12 February 2003,
P.02.1139.F ........................................................................................... 226
Tachiona v. United States, United States, Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
2004, 386 F.3d 205 ............................................................................... 226
United Kingdom, International Criminal Court Act, 2001........................229
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials, UN Doc A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 ........................................... 216
CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Report of the 2019
session, CCW/GGE.1/2019/3................................................212, 216, 217
CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Russian Federation, UN
Doc CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.8 .............................................................. 214
CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Statement of Human
Rights Watch, Bonnie Docherty............................................................217
CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, United States of America,
UN Doc CCW /GGE.1/2017/W P...........................................................214
HRC, General Comment 24, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6....................
....................................................................................................... 214, 221
HRC, General Comment 31, UN Doc CCPR/C/21 /Rev.1 /Add.13 .... 215, 216
HRC, General Comment 36, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36.....................215, 216
1 912020 ]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, 57th Session, UN Doc
A /60/10 .................................................................................................. 2 18
ILC, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, 2006, (A/61/10, ¶251)...................... 220
ILC, Draft Articles on Special Missions with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1967, vol. II, A/6709/Rev.l and
R ev .1/C orr.l............................................................................................226
ILC, Draft articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1974, vol.
II(1) ............................................................................... 207, 208, 209, 210
ILC, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, A/6309/Rev.1................228
ILC, Fifth report on succession in respect of treaties, Special Rapporteur, Sir
.Humphrey Waldock, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1972, vol. II, A/CN .4/256 and Add.1-4.................................................205
ILC, First report on succession of States in respect of treaties, Special
Rapporteur, Sir Francis Vallat, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission 1974, vol. II(1), A/CN.4/278, Add.1-5, Add.5/Corr.1 and
A dd.6 ............................................................................................. 206, 209
ILC, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2013, vol. II, A/68/10
............................................................................................................... 226
ILC, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission on the work of its
seventieth session, 2018, A/73/10.........................................................227
ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001,
Supplement No. 10, UN Doc A/56/10 .................................. 225, 230, 231
ILC, Seventh report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction, Special Rapporteur Concepci6n Escobar Hernindez,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2019, A/CN.4/729 ... 225
ILC, Sixth report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction, Special Rapporteur Concepci6n Escobar Hernandez,
192
Distinguished Brief
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2018, A/CN.4/722 .........
............................................................................................................... 226
ILC, The practice of the UN, the specialized agencies and the IAEA
concerning their status, privileges and immunities, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1967, vol. 11, A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.1
............................................................................................................... 226
Report of the ICJ 1 August 2017-31 July 2018 GA Official Records Seventy-
third Session, Supplement No. 4 A/73/4...............................................220
SC Resolution 1953, 2005, S/RES/1953 ........................................... 228, 230
SC Resolution 1970, 2011, S/RES/1970 ........................................... 228, 230
UN Doc A/HRC/23/47 .............................................................................. 217
UN, Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Committee
of the Whole, 48th Meeting, A/CONF.80/C.1/SR.48 ................... 206, 207
UN, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
ICC, 1998, A/CONF.183/13, vol. 2 ...................................................... 208
UN, Materials on Succession of States, UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.B/14.......209
UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, Christof Heyns 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/26/36....................216
TREATIES AND ARTICLES
Andreas Zimmermann and Christian J. Tams (eds.), The Statute of the
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed., Oxford University
Press, 2019)...........................................................................................216
Caroline Henckels, Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO -
FTA Nexus: A Potential Approach for the WTO, European Journal of
International Law, vol. 19, no. 3 ........................................................... 223
Christian Tams and James Sloan, The Development of International Law by
the International Court of Justice (1st ed., Oxford University Press, 2013)
............................................................................................................... 206
Christof Heyns, Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons
Systems (AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement, Human Rights
Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2 ........................................................................ 216
1932020 ]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
D.P. O'Connell,. The Law On State Succession (1st ed., Cambridge
U niversity Press, 2015).................................................................207, 208
Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, EJIL vol. 21, 2011 .................. 226
Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, American Journal of International Law, vol. 98, No. 3 ..... 225, 228
Frauke Lachenmann and Ridiger Wolfrum (eds.), The Law of Armed
Conflict and the Use of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (1st ed., Oxford University Press, 2017).................208
Gabrielle Marceau, The primacy of the WTO dispute settlement system,
Questions of International Law, vol. 2..................................................221
Guenael Mettraux, John Dugard and Max du Plessis, Heads of State
Immunities, International Crimes and President Bashir's Visit to South
Africa, International Criminal Law Review, vol. 18 ............................ 229
Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd ed., Oxford
University Press, 2013)..........................................................................226
Jacob Cogan (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations,
(Oxford University Press, 2016)...........................................................220
James Crawford (ed.), Brownlie's Principles ofPublic International Law (9th
ed., Oxford University Press, 2019)......................205, 206, 209, 226, 228
Joanne Foakes, The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014).....................228, 229
Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping before
International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 42 ........................................................ 223
Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals
and Conflicting Jurisdiction - Problems and possible solutions, Max
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 5....................................219
Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction
between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements,
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 2003....................................223
Lord McNair, Law of Treaties (1st ed., Oxford University Press, 1986)..207
194
Distinguished Brief
Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party
States, Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke Law Journal, vol. 61, No.
1.............................................................................................................228
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th ed., Cambridge University Press,
20 14) ............................................................................................. 206,20 8
Marco Sassoli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law:
Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified,
US Naval War College, vol. 90 ............................................................ 213
Marko Milanovic, End of application of international humanitarian law,
International Review of the Red Cross, 2014, 96 ................................. 212
Nasila Rembe, The Vienna Convention on State Succession in respect of
Treaties: an African perspective on its applicability and limitations,
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, vol. 17,
N o .2 ...................................................................................................... 2 10
Patrick Dumberry, State Succession to Bilateral Treaties: A Few
Observations on the Incoherent and Unjustifiable Solution Adopted for
Secession and Dissolution of States under the 1978 Vienna Convention, 28
Leiden Journal of International Law ............................................. 205, 209
Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press,
2008).....................................................................................................221
Peter-Tobias Stoll, World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2014......................222
Ramona Pedretti, Immunity of Heads of State and State Officials for
International Crimes, Developments in International Law, vol. 69, Brill
Nijhoff, 2015.........................................................................226, 228, 229
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim 's International Law,
(9th ed., vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 2008)............................207, 209
Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice (A&C Black, 2014).....222,
223
Roger O'Keefe, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015)
....................................................................................................... 225, 227
2020 ] 195
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
Songling Yang, WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice Clause, Michigan State
International Law Review, vol. 23.1....................................................220
Suzanne Bastid, The Cease-Fire, General Report of the International Society
of Military Lawand the Law of War, 1973 ........................................... 217
Taslim Elias, Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, American Journal of
International Law, vol. 74, No. 2...........................................................207
Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates
ofPublic Conscience, American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, No.
1.............................................................................................................214
Tim Graewert, Conflicting laws and jurisdictions in the dispute settlement
process of Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, Contemporary Asia
Arbitration Journal, vol. 1(2).........................................................220, 223
Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry and John McManus, The Cooperation of
States With the International Criminal Court, Fordham International Law
Journal, vol. 25, issue 3, 2001 ............................................................... 229
Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals, 20
Australian Yearbook of International Law 191.............................220, 221
William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2016)................228, 229
Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and
Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2004).................................219, 2214
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, General Comment No.
3.............................................................................................................215
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Official Records
of the Assembly, First session, Part H.A, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1, 2002 ............................................................. 230
Council of Europe, Preliminary Draft Report on the Pilot Project of The
Council on Europe on State Practice Regarding State Succession and
Issues of Recognition, 16th Meeting, 1998 ........................................... 206
196
Distinguished Brief
David Scheffer, International Criminal Court: The Challenge of
Jurisdiction, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, 1999..............................................................................................228
Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, 22 May 2017,
WT/DSB/M/397....................................................................................222
European Political Cooperation, Declaration of the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,
European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin, vol. 7, 1991......
.............................................................................................................. 210
ICJ, Press Release, No. 2019/9, 25 February 2019....................................220
Institut de Droit International, -Third Commission, Resolution on the
Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf
of the State in case of International Crimes, 2009 ............................... 227
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (the Badinter
Commission), 16 July 1993...................................................................210
Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the UNGA, 27
October 2000.........................................................................................223
Mexico- Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO, Amicus
Curiae Brief by Camara Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y
Alcoholera-Mexico, 2006......................................................................222
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Request by Professor Paola Gaeta to submit
observations on the merits of the legal questions presented in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's appeal against the Jordan Decision, 2018,
IC C -02/05-01/09-349 ............................................................................ 229
Sempra Energy International & Camuzzi International, S.A. v. Argentina,
ICSID, ARB/03/02, Opinion of Anne-Marie Slaughter and William
B urke-W hite..........................................................................................224
2020 ] 197
198 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
By virtue of the Joint Notification and the Statement of Agreed Facts
("Compromis", including the Corrections and Clarifications
("Clarifications"), concluded on 9 September 2019, and in accordance with
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the
Republic ofRasasa ("Rasasa") and the State ofAdawa ("Adawa") hereby refer
to this Honourable Court their dispute concerning the Helian Hyacinth. Both
parties have agreed that all claims and counterclaims will be heard together
in a single set of proceedings and that all issues of jurisdiction and
admissibility would be.determined alongside the merits. The Compromis
constitutes a statement of agreed facts and is without prejudice to Rasasa's





Whether the court has jurisdiction over Adawa's claims because Adawa is
not a party to the 1929 Treaty ofBotega.
I.
Whether Rasasa's development and deployment of the wall along the border
between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent with international law.
III.
Whether Adawa's claim that Rasasa's Helian tariffs violate the CHC Treaty
falls outside the court's jurisdiction or is inadmissible, or in the alternative,
the imposition of the tariffs violates the CHC Treaty.
IV.
Whether Adawa's arrest and detention of Ms. Grey constitute internationally
wrongful acts, and she must be repatriated immediately toRasasa.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Adawa and Rasasa are neighbouring countries in the Region of Crosinia
["the Region"]. They share a border that is 201 kilometers long. There are
four other States in the Region. The Region is the only place on Earth where
Helian hyacinth is cultivated. Helian Hyacinth is used in the production of
the flavoring spice Helian.
THE ADAWA-ZEITOUNIA UNION
Until 1928, all six Crosinian States were provinces of the Kingdom of
Crosinia. When the last king died, the provinces divided over competing
claimants to the throne. Rasasa backed the late monarch's brother while
Zeitounia and Adawa - his eldest daughter which ultimately led to a civil war.
On 29 October 1929, the belligerents - Adawa, Zeitounia, and Rasasa - met
in Botega to end the bloodshed. Rasasa declared itself independent while the
provinces of Adawa and Zeitounia united to form the Adawa-Zeitounia
Union ["AZU"]. Rasasa and AZU concluded the Treaty of Botega on
Armistice and Pacification ["Botega Treaty"]. During the 1930s, the AZU
encountered significant economic and social stresses. On 1 January 1939,
Adawa and Zeitounia amicably agreed to dissolve their Union, and each
declared its independence as of that date.
HURRICANE MAKAN
On 14 July 2012, Hurricane Makan struck the Region. More than 60%
of the Helian hyacinths in Rasasa were destroyed, which also resulted in
unemployment rising. In the months following the storm, crime rates
skyrocketed throughout the Region. Armed gangs roamed the countryside,
stealing salvageable Helian plants and harvesting and processing equipment
from the devastated farms.
THE ADAWAN GANGS
In September 2016, the Rasasan and Adawan governments established
a high-level task force to consider joint responses to the increase in cross-
border crimes. The joint task force met several times but was unable to
formulate a comprehensive plan to suppress the gangs. By February 2017,
the disorganized gangs had become a well-armed and organized militia. The
Adawan nationals had established permanent and well-defended
encampments within Rasasan territory, used as bases for international
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trafficking in illegal drugs. On 1 June 2017, the militia simultaneously
attacked nine Rasasan Border Police stations, killing 21 officers. The militia
was heavily armed with military-grade weapons and equipment, and the
attacks indicated a high level of prior planning and training. On 25 June
2017, the Rasasan President authorized the deployment of the Rasasan Army
against the militia camps within Rasasa.
THE WALL
In October 2012, the President of Rasasa convened a meeting of major
Rasasan corporate executives to elicit ideas on how to address the
increasingly serious crime wave that the Police had been unable to staunch.
Darian Grey, former chief executive officer of Rasasan Robotics Corporation
["RRC"], offered the development of a "Weaponized Autonomous
Limitation Line" ["WALL"] to suppress the criminal activities in the region.
In January 2013, the President signed a contract with RRC and invited the
other five States in the Region to take part in the development and research of
the WALL. All six States devoted funds and provided leading government
and private sector scientists and engineers, as well as materials, to the research
and development phase of the project. By August 2013, only Rasasa and
Adawa continued to participate in the development of the venture.
The WALL consists of 10-meter-tall towers, each topped with an
advanced surveillance and response unit. With 360-degree motion-sensing,
high-definition, and infrared cameras, each surveillance unit can closely
monitor all ground and aerial activity within a 130,000 square meter area
around the base of its tower. To respond to threats, each unit is equipped
with an array of lethal and non-lethal options, ranging from speakers
broadcasting audible warnings to non-targeted explosions, and machine guns.
Using advanced artificial intelligence, the WALL can instantaneously and
appropriately decide whether and how to respond to any given threat, without
any intervention by human actors. Although it carries lethal potential as a
last resort, the WALL is unimaginably more reliable than human police or
soldiers. During testing whether the WALL might deploy deadly force when
the situation does not warrant such a response, it demonstrated a "false
positives" rate of less than 0.0001%. With embedded rules instructing its
software to favor non-lethal deterrence, the testing indicated that the WALL
would mistakenly use excessive force no more than once in two hundred
million encounters. Following the attacks upon Rasasan Border Police
stations, Rasasa authorized the purchase of the WALL from RRC and its
installation along the Rasasa-Adawa border. Because of the WALL crime
rates have been reduced by 80% and no injuries are known to have occurred
since its deployment.
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THE HELIAN TARIFFS
In 1964, the six Crosinian States concluded the Treaty Establishing the
Crosinian Helian Community ["CHC Treaty"] in order to share their
agronomic, scientific, and economic data on cultivation of Helian Hyacinth.
They agreed to impose no tariffs on Helian spice and the equipment and
materials used to harvest or process the Helian hyacinth. In 1982 and 1985,
respectively, Rasasa and Adawa acceded to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ["GATT"] and submitted tariff schedules with zero bound
rates on Helian products. In 1995, the two States became parties to the World
Trade Organisation ["WTO"].
In 2017, the President of Rasasa submitted a bill to Parliament for the
introduction of 25% ad valorem tariffs on unprocessed Helian in an effort to
encourage Rasasa's domestic processors to return to local farms for their
feedstock. The Parliament adopted his proposal in January 2018. Adawa
protested to the decision and requested consultations pursuant to Articles 1
and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ["DSU"] of the WTO. The consultations proved
unsuccessful. In February 2019, Adawa requested the establishment of a
panel pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, alleging that Rasasa's tariffs on
Helian products were an unjustifiable breach of its commitment to maintain
the zero bound rate.
THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY
In 1998, Adawa became party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court ["Rome Statute"]. Rasasa is not a party to the Rome Statute.
In 2009, Garantia, a State party to the Rome Statute, referred a situation that
occurred on its territory to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
["ICC"]. The referral specifically mentioned RRC as one of the accused
foreign contractors, and cited Ms. Grey as having being personally
responsible for war crimes. The Prosecutor opened an investigation in
August 2009. In 2017, Ms. Grey became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Rasasa. On 18 June 2019, the CHC welcomed representatives of its Member
States to Novazora, the Adawan capital, for its annual meeting. Minister
Grey, representing Rasasa, arrived on 18 June 2019 for the four-day session.
On 20 June 2019, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued a warrant of arrest
for Minister Grey. On 22 June 2019, Ms. Grey was arrested while leaving





This Court lacks jurisdiction as Adawa is not a party to the Botega
Treaty. Adawa has not automatically succeeded to the Botega Treaty. Such
a rule does not exist under customary international law or alternatively, the
intertemporal rule precludes its application. Furthermore, Adawa did not
succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of a territorial regime as there is no
such regime between Rasasa and Adawa - Adawa does not succeed to the
Botega Treaty by virtue of Article 1(2) or Article 3(1). Alternatively, Adawa
succeeded only to the treaty provisions which establish territorial regimes
and not to the jurisdiction clause of the Treaty. Additionally, Adawa failed
to obtain Rasasa's consent to become a party to the Botega Treaty and Rasasa
has not tacitly consented to Adawa's succession to the Botega Treaty. Thus,
the jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty cannot be invoked as a
ground for jurisdiction.
I.
Rasasa's deployment of the WALL is consistent with international law.
The WALL's deployment does not violate the rules of international
humanitarian law applicable during a non-international armed conflict - the
principles of distinction, precaution, proportionality, and the Martens Clause.
Furthermore, Rasasa does not violate human rights law as Adawa does not
have standing to bring a claim regarding the WALL's deployment.
Alternatively, Rasasa has no extraterritorial obligations towards Adawans.
Alternatively, alleged violations of the right to life are determined by IHL
during an armed conflict. In any case, the WALL does not violate the right
to life. Moreover, there is no requirement for meaningful human control over
the WALL and its deployment does not violate the object and purpose of the
Botega Treaty. Additionally, Adawa is barred to object to the development
of the WALL under the clean hands doctrine.
i .
The ICJ lacks jurisdiction over this dispute as the WTO panels have
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes regarding Helian tariffs. Additionally,
the jurisdiction of the WTO panels is lex specialis and lex posterior to the
jurisdiction of this Court. Alternatively, the ongoing proceedings before
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the WTO panel are a bar for the admissibility of the claim pursuant to the
principle of lis pendens and the principle of comity. Additionally, the
submission of the claim constitutes an abuse of process. In any event, the
tariffs do not breach the CHC Treaty as they are necessary to protect Rasasa's
essential security interests and, consequently, Adawa is not entitled to
compensation.
IV.
Ms. Grey enjoys personal immunity from arrest and detention under the
CHC Treaty. As a Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Grey has immunity under
customary law. Adawa violated Ms. Grey's immunities by exercising
domestic jurisdiction over her. Adawa cannot arrest Ms. Grey pursuant to
the ICC's arrest warrant since ICC does not have jurisdiction over nationals of
non-State parties. Alternatively, Ms. Grey's immunities bar the jurisdiction
of the ICC. In any event, Adawa is bound to respect Ms. Grey's immunities
even when it cooperates with the ICC. Additionally, there is no customary
rule rendering immunities inapplicable in cases of cooperation with ICC. Ms.




A. TIE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ADAWA'S
CLAIMS BECAUSE ADAWA IS NOT A PARTY TO THE 1929
TREATY OF BOTEGA
The jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty is invalid as Adawa
is not a party to the Botega Treaty. Adawa has not automatically succeeded
to the Treaty. Moreover, Adawa has not succeeded to the Treaty by virtue of
a territorial regime. Additionally, Adawa failed to obtain Rasasa's consent to
become a party to the Botega Treaty. Thus, the jurisdiction clause in Article
6 Botega Treaty cannot be invoked as a ground for jurisdiction.
I. Adawa has not automatically succeeded to the Botega Treaty
Generally, the successor State does not inherit obligations and rights of
the predecessor.1 The Applicant cannot claim that it has automatically
succeeded to the Botega Treaty after the dissolution of the AZU2 since no
such customary rule exists. Alternatively, even if such custom exists
presently, the intertemporal rule precludes its application. In any case, the
automatic succession rule is intended to cover only multilateral human rights
treaties and not bilateral relations such as those between Rasasa and Adawa,3
hence it is inapplicable.
a) AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION IS NOT PART OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep ser, p. 595,
["Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections"], Separate Opinion, Judge Weeramantry, pp. 643-644;
Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kreca, p. 777; ILC, Fifth reporton
succession in respect of treaties, Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 1972, vol. II, A/CN.4/256 and Add. 1-4, p. 44, commentary 1; James
Crawford (ed.), Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (9th ed., Oxford University Press,
2019), ["Brownlie"], p. 423.
2. Case Concerning the Helian Hyacinth (State of Adawa v. Republic of Rasasa),
["Compromis"], 17.
3. Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Separate Opinion, Judge Weeramantry, p. 645;
Patrick Dumberry, State Succession to Bilateral Treaties: A Few Observations on the Incoherent and
Unjustifiable Solution Adoptedfor Secession and Dissolution of States under the 1978 Vienna Convention,
28 Leiden Journal of International Law, ["Dumberry"], p. 22.
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As Adawa and Rasasa are not parties to the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States with respect to treaties ["VCSST'], 4 Adawa cannot rely
on Article 34 of the Convention which regulates automatic succession to
treaties in cases of union dissolution.5
Adawa might claim that automatic succession is representative of
international custom. However, it is consistently affirmed that this norm is
merely progressive development of law.6 Hence, the Applicant has the
burden to establish that the rule has acquired a customary status.7 The
requirement for emergence of custom from a treaty provision is "extensive
and virtually uniform" State practice and opiniojuris.8 The International Law
Commission ["ILC"] regards the State practice for automatic succession as
insufficient since "the precedents [...] are few"9 and "far from conclusive".10
Furthermore, attempts to codify the rule received disapproval from numerous
States.1' Consequently, the threshold for custom is not met.
b) ALTERNATIVELY, THE INTERTEMPORAL RULE PRECLUDES THE
APPLICATION OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION
Even if automatic succession has recently acquired the status of a
customary norm, it cannot be invoked by Adawa due to the intertemporal
4. Compromis, ¶60; Clarifications, (e.).
5. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of treaties, 1978, UNTS 1946, p. 3,
["VCSST"], Art. 34.
6. Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kre5a, p. 779; UN,
Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Committee of the Whole, 48th Meeting,
A/CONF.80/C.1/SR.48, p. 105, ["Conference on State Succession"], 110; Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Project
(Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Rep 1997, ["Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros"], Memorial of the Republic of Hungary,
p. 323, ¶10.112; Council of Europe, Preliminary Draft Report on the Pilot Project of The Council on
Europe on State Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition, 16th Meeting, 1998, p.
43; Christian Tams and James Sloan, The Development of International Law by the International Court
of Justice (1st ed., Oxford University Press, 2013)p. 61; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2014), ["Shaw"], p. 710; Brownlie, p. 423.
7. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1950, p. 276.
8. North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark, Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment,
ICJ Rep 1969, p. 3, ["North Sea"], ¶74.
9. ILC, First report on succession of States in respect of treaties, Special Rapporteur, Sir
Francis Vallat, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1974, vol. 11(1), A/CN.4/278, Add.A-5,
Add.5/Corr.I and Add.6, p. 1, ["First report on State Succession"], ¶399.
10. First report on State Succession,1399.
11. First report on State Succession,¶391.
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rule. The intertemporal rule, reaffirmed by the ICJ,1 2 provides that "a
juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with
it"." Automatic succession was declared as progressive development of law
in 1978.14 Thus, it could not have been part of customary international law
at the time of the dissolution of the AZU in 1939."
II. Adawa did not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of a
territorial regime
Under Article 12 VCSST, which is reflective of customary
law,"6 territorial regimes and boundaries" are not affected by State
succession. 8 However, Adawa cannot succeed to the Botega Treaty under
this rule as the Treaty does not establish a territorial regime between Adawa
and Rasasa. Alternatively, Adawa succeeds only to the Treaty provisions
which establish the territorial regime.
a) THE BOTEGA TREATY DOES NOT ESTABLISH A TERRITORIAL
REGIME BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA
(i) Adawa does not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of
Article 1(2)
Territorial regimes are impressed with 'a status intended to be
permanent.1 9 The demarcation lines established by Article 1(2) Botega
12. Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v.
United States ofAmerica), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1952, p. 189; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South
Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgement, ICJ Rep 1966, ¶16.
13. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States of America), Reports of International
Arbitration Awards 1928, vol. II, p. 829, ["Island of Palmas"], p. 845; Taslim Elias, Doctrine of
Intertemporal Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 74, No. 2, p. 288.
14. Conference on State Succession, p. 105, 110; Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections,
Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kreca, p. 779.
15. Compromis,$7.
16. Gabeikovo-Nagymaros, ¶123.
17. ILC, Draft articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1974, vol. 11(1), p. 174, ["Draft Articles VCSST"], Art.
12, commentary 2.
18. VCSST, Art. 12; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim 's International Law,
(9th ed., vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 2008), ["Oppenheim"], p. 238; Lord McNair, Law of Treaties (1st
ed., Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 590.
19. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1994, p. 6,
["Territorial Disputc"], ¶¶72-73; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Rep 2007, p. 624, ["Territorial and Maritime Dispute"], 189; D. P. O'Connell, The Law
On State Succession (1st ed., Cambridge University Press, 2015), ["O'Connell"], p. 49.
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Treaty do not meet the requirement for permanency as they are "without
prejudice to the ultimate settlement".20 Generally, demarcation lines are not
recognized as establishing permanent regimes. 21 Additionally, territorial
regimes must be "independent ofthe personality of the State"22 and the
political context.23  However, the demarcation lines were tied to the
personalities of the former AZU and Rasasa as they were aimed at
"separating their armed forces"24 to end the conflict.25 Consequently, the
demarcation lines do not establish a territorial regime.
(ii) Adawa does not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of
Article 3(1)
The peace zone established by Article 3(1) Botega Treaty may be
recognized as a territorial regime.26 However, Adawa cannot succeed to it as
the provision refers to a peace zone situated exclusively on the border
between Zeitounia and Rasasa.27
Furthermore, Adawa does not succeed to the right of free passage
enshrined in the provision as it is conferred upon the individuals and not to
the States.2 8 Under the territorial regime rule, States do not succeed to rights
of individuals. 29 Thus, Adawa does not succeed to any rights or obligations
deriving from the peace zone 30 and respectively to the Botega Treaty.
b) ALTERNATIVELY, ADAWA SUCCEEDS ONLY TO THE TREATY
PROVISIONS WHICH ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL REGIMES
20. Botega Treaty, Art. 1(2).
21. Frauke Lachenmann and Rtdiger Wolfrum (eds.), The Law ofArmed Conflict and the Use
of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1st ed., Oxford University Press,
2017), p. 325, ¶¶1, 7.
22. O'Connell, p. 49.
23. Shaw, p. 703.
24. Botega Treaty, Art 1(2).
25. Compromis, ¶5.
26. Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 12, commentary 1.
27. Botega Treaty, Art 3(1).
28. Botega Treaty, Art. 3(1).
29. Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 12, commentary 29.
30. VCSST, Art. 12(2).
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In any case, under Article 12 VCSST States succeed only to the
provisions which establish territorial regimes - not to the treaty as a whole.31
Accordingly, the ICJ has declared that only the territorial regime enjoys
permanence and not the entire treaty itself.32 This is the case of succession to
peace treaties where there are other provisions which are not related to the
establishment ofthe regime. 33 Hence, States do not succeed to supplementary
provisions to the regime,34 such as jurisdiction clauses.
In any event, a jurisdiction clause may be invoked only for a dispute
related to the established regime35 which, however, is not subject to the
present proceedings. Consequently, Adawa cannot rely on the jurisdiction
clause enshrined in Article 6 Botega Treaty to establish the jurisdiction of the
Court.
II. Adawa failed to obtain Rasasa's consent to become party to the
Botega Treaty
States have maintained the application of the "clean slate" principle in
cases of dissolution of unions.3 6 The "clean slate" principle stipulates that a
successor State cannot claim any right or become party to any of its
predecessor's bilateral treaties.37 For this reason, in cases of bilateral treaties,
not falling under Article 12 VCSST, 38 the successor State has to obtain the
consent of the other party in order to become a party to the treaty. 39 Consent
31. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, Reply of the Republic of Hungary, vol. 1, 113.141, 3.149; Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland) (Second Phase) (1930), PCIJ Ser
A No 24, p. 17; Draft Articles VCSST, Arts. 11, 12, commentary 36; Brownlie, p. 425;
Oppenheim, p. 213.
32. Territorial Dispute, ¶¶72-73; Territorial and Maritime Dispute, 189.
33. First report on State Succession, ¶444.
34. First report on State Succession, 1444; UN, Materials on Succession of States, UN Doc
ST/LEG/SERB/14, p. 187.
35. Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 12, commentary 7.
36. Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, p. 126,
¶1.1.4.10; First report on State Succession, ¶98; Dumberry, p. 27.
37. Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 23, commentary 2; Oppenheim, pp. 238-239.
38. VCSST, Art. 24.
39. Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 23, commentary 12.
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should be clearly expressed40by a subsequent notification 41 or agreement, 42
however no such are present. As a result, Adawa did not succeed to the
Treaty.
a) RASASA HAS NOT TACITLY CONSENTED TO ADAWA'S
SUCCESSION TO THE BOTEGA TREATY
A State may tacitly consent to be bound by a legal situation through its
unilateral conduct under the doctrine of acquiescence. 43 The concept of
acquiescence is applicable only when the circumstances require a response
by the consenting State.44 Correspondingly, after the invocation of alleged
violations of the Botega Treaty by Adawa, 45 Rasasa explicitly objected the
purported succession of Adawa to the Treaty.4 6 Thus, Rasasa has not
acquiesced to the succession of Adawa to the Botega Treaty.
IV. The jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty cannot be
invoked as a ground for jurisdiction
Treaties contain rights only for the contracting parties 4 7 As Adawa is
not a successor and respectively - not a party to the Botega Treaty,48 the
jurisdiction clause embodied in Article 6 Botega Treaty is not in force
between Adawa and Rasasa. Thus, Adawa cannot invoke Article 6 as a
ground for this Court's jurisdiction. 49
40. Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 23, commentaries 14, 15.
41. Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, 118; Nasila Rembe, The Vienna Convention on
State Succession in respect of Treaties: an African perspective on its applicability and limitations,
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 134-135.
42. Draft Articles VCSST, Arts. 33, 34, commentary 6; International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission), 16 July 1993, pp. 1495-1496, (e.); European Political
Cooperation, Declaration of the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union, European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin, vol. 7, 1991, p. 770.
43. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States
ofAmerica), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1984, ¶130.
44. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysiav. Singapore), Judgement, ICJ Rep 2008, ¶121.
45. Compromis,¶38.
46. Compromis, 55.
47. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UNTS 1155, p. 331, ["VCLT"], Arts. 26,
34.
48. Pleadings, (1.)(A.)-(C.).
49. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, UNTS 1055, ["ICJ Statute"], Art. 37.
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B. RASASA'S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE
WALL ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA
IS CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Rasasa's deployment of the WALL is consistent with international law.
Furthermore, Adawa is barred from objecting to the development of the
WALL.
L The deployment of the WALL is consistent with international law
The WALL's deployment does not violate international humanitarian
law ["IHL"] and human rights law ["HIRL"]. Moreover, there is no
requirement for meaningful human control over the WALL. Additionally,
the deployment does not violate the object and purpose of the Botega Treaty.
a) THE WALL'S DEPLOYMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE 1IHL
(i) Rasasa has to observe IHL due to the non-international
armed conflict
The Respondent is in a state of non-international armed conflict since
2017.50 Such conflict exists when dissident armed groups capable of carrying
out military operations and having permanent camps within a State's territory
fight military forces of that State.5' The standard is met as Rasasa's military
force was deployed against the "heavily armed"52 and organized Adawan
militia which had established permanent encampments within Rasasan
territory.53 The conflict is governed by the rules applicable to non-
international conflicts, expressed in the Geneva Conventions54 to which
50. Compromis, ¶¶ 34-35, 37.
51. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, 1977, UNTS 1125, p. 609, Art. 1(1);
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6 (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction)
(2 October 1995), IT-94-1-A, ICTY, ["TadiU"], ¶70; Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, 11.137 (1997),
IACHR, Report N" 55/97, p. 271, ["Abella"], ¶152.
52. Compromis, ¶36.
53. Compromis, 134-35.
54. Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, 1949, UNTS
75, p. 287, common Art. 3.
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Rasasa is a party," and customary IHL.56 Rasasa is bound to respect the fIL
regime until a peaceful settlement is reached.57
(ii) The WALL complies with the rules of IHL
IHL rules govern the use of weapons during an armed conflict.58
Accordingly, Rasasa submits that the WALL complies with the IHL
principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality. Additionally, the
Martens Clause cannot render the WALL prohibited.
(iii) The WALL complies with the principle of distinction
The principle of distinction requires that a weapon must be able to
distinguish between civilians, hors de combat individuals, and militants. 59
The WALL draws such distinction using data, acquired by military and
police officials which included millions of images, video footage, and
computer models. 60 Consequently, the WALL can successfully distinguish
between armed threats and hors de combat individuals, 61 and the chance of
the WALL targeting civilian individuals is virtually zero.62 Thus, the WALL
complies with the principle of distinction.
(iv) The WALL complies with the principle ofprecaution
Under the principle of precaution belligerents must take all feasible care
to spare civilian life when using lethal weapons.63 Feasibility is determined
55. Compromis,160.
56. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits,
ICJ Rep 1986, ["Nicaragua"], p.114,¶1218- 2 19; Tadi6,1167-70.
57. Tadid, 170; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (3 April
2008), ICTY,1100; Marko Milanovic, End ofapplication ofinternational humanitarian law, International
Review of the Red Cross, 2014, 96, p. 179.
58. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1996, p. 226,
["Nuclear Weapons"], 186; CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area
of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Report of the 2019 session, CCW/GGE.1/2019/3, ["LAWs
Report"], 117(a), (c).
59. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflicts, UNTS 1125, p. 3, ["Protocol I"], Arts. 48, 51(2),
52(2); Nuclear Weapons, 178; Tadi6,1110.
60. Compromis, 20.
61. Compromis,¶20.
62. Compromis, 1118, 25.
63. Protocol I, Art. 57(1); Prosecutor v. Kupreskid, IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (14
January 2000), ICTY, ["Kupreskid"], 1535.
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by what is practical in the specific circumstances.64 In particular, the WALL
must verify lawful targets,'6  minimise civilian loss of life,66 and cancel
unlawful attacks.6 7 Respectively, the WALL's surveillance units ensure
continuous verification of targets through motion-sensing, infrared cameras 68
and can instantaneously and appropriately decide whether and how to
respond to any given threat.69 Since the WALL is able to verify targets in the
first place, 70 it is equally able to sense changes in a given situation and cancel
an attack if information indicates that it would be unlawful.7 Thus, the WALL
complies with the principle of precaution.
(v) The WALL complies with the principle ofproportionality
Under the proportionality principle the WALL cannot deploy an attack
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life which would be excessive in
relation to the direct military advantage.72 Respectively, the WALL has
engaged in approximately 105 operations73 without causing any civilian
injuries. 74 Each of these operations provided significant military advantage
by ultimately reducing 80% of the hostilities.75 Thus, the WALL complies
with the principle of proportionality.
(vi) The Martens Clause cannot render the WALL prohibited
The Martens Clause is a mere guideline regarding the applicability of
weapons not regulated by IHL.76 It entails that the rules of IHL regarding
weapons should be construed in a manner consistent with the dictates of
public conscience and the principles of humanity.77 However, the clause
64. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related
Claims, Eritrea's Claim, Partial Award, 19 December 2005, ¶27.
65. Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(a)(i).
66. Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(a)(ii).




71. Marco Sassoli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages,
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, US Naval War College, vol. 90, p. 337.
72. Protocol I, Arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); Kupreski6, ¶535.
73. Clarifications, ¶4.
74. Compromis, 142; Clarifications, 14.
75. Compromis, 141.
76. Nuclear Weapons, ¶78.
77. Protocol I, Art. 1(2).
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cannot prohibit autonomous systems as it depends on the existence of a
prohibitory rule of customary international law.78 However, such a rule does
not exist presently.
Alternatively, the WALL does not violate the principles of humanity
and the dictates of public conscience. First, the principles of humanity
encompass only IHL rules79 which the WALL observes. 80 Second, the public
conscience is to be deduced from authoritative sources such as General
Assembly resolutions and law-making treaties.8' Presently, there are no such
authoritative sources prohibiting lethal autonomous systems, rather States are
in preliminary stages of exploring the capabilities of such systems. 82
b) THE WALL DOES NOT VIOLATE HRL
(i) Adawa does not have standing to bring a claim regarding
the WALL's deployment
Rasasa and Adawa are parties to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ["ICCPR"]. 83 The ICCPR concerns rights of
individuals84 and does not confer standing on States except in cases of
diplomatic protection. Absent any direct injury, Adawa does not have
standing in respect of the deployment of the WALL as it cannot identify any
victim upon whom it can exercise diplomatic protection. 85
(ii) Rasasa does not have extraterritorial obligations towards
Adawans
78. Nuclear Weapons, Letter dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, together with
Written Comments of the United Kingdom, 13.58.
79. Nicaragua, 1218; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and
Dictates of Public Conscience, American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, No. 1, p. 82.
80. Pleadings, (lI.)(A.)(1.).
81. Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen, pp. 410-411.
82. CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, Russian Federation, UN Doc CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.8,16; CCW, Group
of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems, United States of America, UN Doc CCW/GGE.l/2017/WP.7,114-5.
83. Compromis,160.
84. HRC, General Comment 24, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6, ["GC 24"], 117.
85. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. UK) (Jurisdiction) (1924), PCIJ Ser
A No 2, ["Mavrommatis"], p. 12.
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The ICCPR limits human rights obligations of States to individuals
within their territory or under their jurisdiction.86 As jurisdiction is primarily
territorial, 87 Rasasa has no obligation to protect rights of Adawans as they are
outside its territory. Jurisdiction applies extraterritorially in exceptional
circumstances. 88 Such instances occur when the State exercises control8 9 over
the other State's territory through administrative organs90 or conduct of its
agents abroad. 91 Considering that Rasasa does not exercise such control over
Adawa's territory, it has no extraterritorial jurisdiction over Adawan citizens.
(iii) Alleged violations of the right to life are determined by IHL
during an armed conflict
Article 6 ICCPR prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. 92 Although this
prohibition continues to exist for Rasasa during armed conflicts, 93 what is
"arbitrary" is determined in accordance with IHL which regulates the use of
lethal force in times of armed conflicts. 94 Accordingly, as the WALL
complies with IHL, 95 there is no violation of Article 6 ICCPR.
(iv) In any case, the WALL does not violate the right to ife
The right to life can be violated either by arbitrary depriving life96 or by
putting an individual's life at stake.9 7 Presently, neither deprivation of life
nor lethal threat to civilians has taken place. 98 Although the WALL possesses
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNTS 999, p. 171, ["ICCPR"], Art.
2(1); HRC, General Comment 31, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13, ["GC 31"], 13.
87. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 2004, p. 136, ["Wall Advisory"], 1109.
88. Bankovik v. Belgium, No. 52207/99, [2001], ECtHR, ¶61.
89. Wall Advisory, 1110; Loizidou v. Turkey, No. 15318/89, [1996], ECtHR, ¶52.
90. Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 25781/94, [2001], ECtHR, ¶76.
91. Pad v. Turkey, No. 60167/00, [2007], ECtHR, 153.
92. ICCPR, Art. 6(1).
93. HRC, General Comment 36, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, ["GC 36"], ¶64.
94. Nuclear Weapons, ¶25; Abella, ¶161; Coard et Al. v. United States, Case 10.951 (1999),
IACHR, Report No. 109/99, ¶42; Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (Preliminary
objections, merits and reparations) (2012), IACtHR, 1211; Hassan v. UK, No. 29750/09, [2011], ECtHR,
¶102; ACHPR, General Comment No. 3, ¶32.
95. Pleadings, (ll.)(A.)(1.).
96. ICCPR, Art. 6(1).
97. Oneryildiz v. Turkey, No. 48939/99, [2004], ECtHR, 171; GC 36, 116-7.
98. Compromis, 142; Clarifications, 14.
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lethal capacity, 99 there are no binding rules regarding preemptive regulation
of lethal force, rather existing guidelines are considered as soft-law.1 00
Alternatively, the WALL complies with the requirements for lawful use of
lethal force - the principles of strict necessity and proportionality.10'
First, strict necessity entails that the use of lethal force is only
permissible as a last resort in the face of a grave threat to another person's
life.1 02 Presently, even Adawa declared that the WALL would not deploy
lethal force when the situation does not warrant such response.t 03
Accordingly, the WALL has issued only verbal signals and non lethal
warning shots. 104 Thus, the WALL complies with the principle of strict
necessity.
Second, proportionality stipulates that the force employed shall
correspond to the threat posed.1 05 Hence, measures ensuring graduation of
force must be implemented. 06 Respectively, the WALL has an array of non-
lethal options for incapacitation1 07 and favours non-lethal deterrence.'0 8
Thus, the WALL complies with the principles of proportionality.
c) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL
OVER THE WALL
Although the WALL acts independently of human control,'09 this is not
a violation since further research of the human element in LAWs is
required." 0  As technology has only recently reached a level where some
99. Compromis, 1124-25.
100. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Christof Heyns 2014, UN Doc A/H RC/26/36, ["Christof Heyns"], 143.
101. GC 31, 16; Christof Heyns, Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems
(AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 363-364.
102. GC 36,112; McCann v. the United Kingdom, No. 18984/91, [1995], ECtHR,1149; Nachova
v. Bulgaria, No 43577/98, [2005], ECtHR, 195; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by




105. Basic Principles, principle 5(a).
106. Basic Principles, principle 4; Christof Heyns, 166.
107. Compromis, 1124, 37.
108. Compromis,125.
109, Compromis,124.
110. LAWs Report, 122(a).
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systems could be considered fully autonomous,"' neither settled State
practice, nor opinio juris have been expressed." 2 Although NGOs have
raised ethical considerations for such a requirement,"3 such considerations
do not render a general obligation for States," 4 and cannot be considered
reflective of State practice. Thus, there is no requirement for meaningful
human control over the WALL. In any case, such requirement would exist
in order to ensure compliance of autonomous systems with IHL." 5 Presently,
the WALL complies with the rules of IHL without human control."'
d) THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE BOTEGA TREATY ARE NOT
VIOLATED
The Botega Treaty must be interpreted from its text, including its
preamble,"' and in light of its object and purpose."' The Botega Treaty is
an armistice agreement which aims at restoration of regional peace and
security.19 Such agreements establish temporal suspension of hostilities
between States and do not entail demilitarization if that is not explicitly
provided. 2 0 Thus, the militarization of the border through the WALL'" does
not violate the object and purpose of the Botega Treaty. Additionally, as the
regional peace was threatened by the Adawan militia,'2 2 the WALL preserved
111. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Christof Heyns, 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/23/47,145.
112. North Sea,¶77.
113. CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, Statement of Human Rights Watch, Bonnie Docherty, 2018.
114. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, ICJ
Rep 1966, 1149-50.
115. LAWs Report, 117(e).
116. Pleadings, (1t.)(A.)(2.).
117. VCLT, Art. 31(2).
118. VCLT, Art. 31(1); LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep
2001, 99; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections,
ICJ Rep 2004, p. 429, ["Legality of Use of Force"], ¶98.
119. Botega Treaty, Preamble, 1¶3, 5-6.
120. Suzanne Bastid, The Cease-Fire, General Report of the International Society of Military
Law and the Law of War, 1973, pp. 37-38; Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
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the object and purpose of the Botega Treaty by reducing 80% of the
hostilities.12'
H. Adawa is barred from objecting to the development of the WALL
under the clean hands doctrine
Under the clean hands doctrine, consistently reaffirmed by judges on the
PCIJ 24 and ICJ,125 a State engaged in non-performance of obligations lacks
standing to challenge non-performance of corresponding obligations by
another State. 126 Adawa was involved throughout the whole development of
the WALL 27 by devoting funding, scientists, engineers,1 28 and military
experts.1 29 Thus, under the clean hands doctrine Adawa is barred from
objecting to the development of the WALL.
C. ADAWA'S CLAIM THAT HELIAN TARIFFS IMPOSED BY
RASASA VIOLATED THE CHC TREATY FALLS OUTSIDE THE
COURT'S JURISDICTION OR IS INADMISSIBLE. IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS DID NOT
VIOLATE THE CHC TREATY
Rasasa submits that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this claim.
Alternatively, the claim is inadmissible. In any event, the imposition of
tariffs does not breach the CHC Treaty.
I. The Court does not have jurisdiction to examine this claim
The ICJ lacks jurisdiction over this dispute as the WTO panels have
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes regarding Helian tariffs. Additionally,
the jurisdiction of the WTO panels is lex specialis and lex posterior to the
jurisdiction of this Court.
123. Compromis,141.
124. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) (1937), PCIJ Ser A/B No 17,
Individual Opinion, Judge Hudson, p. 77.
125. Nicaragua, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Schwebel, ¶268; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2002, p. 3, ["Arrest Warrant"],
Dissenting Opinion, Judge Van den Wyngaert,135.
126. Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction) (1927), PCIJ Ser A No 9,
["Chorz6w Factory"], p. 31; Gabekovo-Nagymaros, ¶110; ILC, Report of the International Law






a) THE WTO PANELS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER
DISPUTES REGARDING HELIAN TARIFFS
The dispute between the parties concerns the imposition of tariffs - a
matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of WTO panels."' The PCIJ"and
the ICJ 3 2 have declared that the Court does not have jurisdiction where
another body has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.1 3 Adawa and
Rasasa have identical obligations to impose no tariffs on Helian products
under both the WTO regime 3 4 and CHC Treaty. 3 5 To distinguish two
disputes arising under the same obligations "would be art ficial".136 Thus,
violation of identical obligations constitutes "a single dispute".1 37
Consequently, the WTO panels have exclusive jurisdiction over the
present dispute.
b) THE WTO PANELS' JURISDICTION IS LEX SPECIALIS TO THE ICJ'S
JURISDICTION
The Botega Treaty 38 and the WTO Agreement1 39 confer jurisdiction
over this dispute to two separate forums which creates a jurisdictional
130. WTO Agreement, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, 1994, UNTS 1869, p. 401, ["DSU"], Art. 23; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, UNTS 1867, p. 154, ["WTO Agreement"];
Art. 2(4); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex IA, 1994, UNTS 64, p. 187, ["GAT"], Art.
2.
131. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (1928), PCIJ Ser A No 15,
["Upper Silesia"), p. 23.
132. Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order of 3 October 2018, ¶39.
133. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting
Jurisdiction - Problems and possible solutions, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 5, p. 88.
134. Compromis, ¶12.
135. CHC Treaty, Art. 3.
136. Southern Bluefin Tuna case (New Zealand-Japan, Australia-Japan), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Reports of International Arbitral Awards 2000, vol. XXIII, pp. 1-57, ["p Tuna"], 154; MOX
Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, PCA, 2003, ["MOX Plant"], ¶26.
137. Southern Bluefin Tuna, ¶54; Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International
Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2004), ["Shany"], p. 8, 154.
138. Botega Treaty, Art. 6.
139. DSU, Art. 23.
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conflict.'4 0 Such conflict is resolved through the principle of lex specialis.'4 '
This principle, affirmed by the ICJ,142 PCIJ,14 3 and international tribunals"
provides that special jurisdiction prevails over the general.1 5  The
jurisdiction of the WTO panels covers specifically trade disputes'" while the
jurisdiction of the ICJ is general. 147  Thus, the WTO panels' jurisdiction
prevails over this Court's jurisdiction.
c) THE WTO AGREEMENT IS LEX POSTERIOR TO THE BOTEGA
TREATY
A treaty establishing jurisdiction applies only to the extent it is not
superseded by a later treaty which provides different jurisdiction over the
matter. 4 8 Even if initially the ICJ had jurisdiction over disputes regarding
Helian tariffs,' when the two States concluded the WTO Agreement in
1995150 they excluded this Court's jurisdiction."' Therefore, the WTO
panel's jurisdiction prevails over this Court's jurisdiction.
140. ILC, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 2006, (A/61/10,
1251), ["Report on Fragmentation"], 12, 26; Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International
Tribunals, 20 Australian Yearbook of International Law 191, ["Lowe"], p. 194; Tim Graewert, Conflicting
laws and jurisdictions in the dispute settlement process of Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO,
Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, vol. 1(2), ["Graewert"], p. 290.
141. Report on Fragmentation, ¶¶6, 9.
142. Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Judgement, ICJ
Rep 1960, p. 40; Ambatielos case (Greece v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1952, p.
44.
143. Mavrommatis, pp. 31-32; Chorz6w Factory, p. 30; Jurisdiction of European Commission of
Danube Between Galatz and Braila (Advisory Opinion) (1927), PCIJ Ser B No 14, p. 64.
144. Southern Bluefin Tuna, 164-65; European Communities - Regime for The Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO, Appellate Body Report, 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, 1204.
145. Songling Yang, WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice Clause, Michigan State International
Law Review, vol. 23.1, p. 135.
146. DSU, Art. 23.
147. Botega Treaty, Art. 6; Report of the ICJ 1 August 2017-31 July 2018 GA Official Records
Seventy-third Session, Supplement No. 4 A/73/4,17; ICJ, Press Release, No. 2019/9,25 February 2019, p.
6; Jacob Cogan (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, (Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 885.
148. Mavrommatis, p. 31; VCLT, Art. 30(3); Brownlie, p. 364.
149. Botega Treaty, Art. 6.
150. Compromis, 112.
151. WTO Agreement, Art. 3(3); DSU, Art. 23.
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H. Alternatively, Adawa's claim is inadmissible
The ongoing proceedings before the WTO panel'5 2 are a bar for the
admissibility of the claim due to the principle of lispendens and the principle
of comity. Additionally, the submission of the claim constitutes an abuse of
process.
a) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LIS
PENDENS
Lis pendens is a general principle of law forbidding parallel
proceedings, 53 which prevents conflicting judgements.' This principle is
universally accepted by States,'" enshrined in international conventions,5 6
and has been applied by international tribunals.' Lispendens can be invoked
when identical disputes are adjudicated before bodies of the same
character.151
152. Compromis, 147.
153. Shany, p. 22; Lowe, pp. 202-203; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Canada-
Mexico, 1994, 32 ILM 289, Art. 2005(6); Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer (eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 1021.
154. Upper Silesia, p. 20; MOX Plant, ¶28; Gabrielle Marceau, The primacy of the WTO dispute
settlement system, Questions of International Law, vol. 2, p. 10.
155. GC 24, 114; Shany, pp. 155, 162; France, New Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 100; Italy,
Code ofCivil Procedure, Art. 39(2); Germany, Code of Civil Procedure, Section 261(3)(1); Reservations to
the Optional protocol to the 1CCPR, 1966, UNTS 999, p. 171, made by Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador,
Iceland, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uganda.
156. Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement ofjudgements in civil and commercial
matters, 1968, Art. 21; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950,
UNTS 213, p. 221, Art. 35(2)(b); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1984, UNTS vol. 1465, p. 85, Art. 22(5).
157. Pey Casado and Foundation President Allende v. Chile, ICSID, ARB/98/2, IIC 1347,
Decision on the request for the stay of enforcement of the award, 15 March 2018, ¶79; Certain Criminal
Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 2003, p. 102,
Dissenting Opinion, Judge de Cara, p. 121.
158. Upper Silesia, p. 20; Busta and Busta v. Czech Republic, Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Final Award, V 2015/014, IIC 928, 2017, ¶210.
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First, the disputes before the WTO panels and the ICJ are identical as they
concern the same factual basis1 59 and complained injury'" - the imposition
of tariffs which impede free trade of Helian products. Lis pendens is
applicable even if parties rely on different treaties' 6' or part of the claim is
not the same.1 62 Thus, the fact that Adawa invokes the CHC Treaty before
the ICJ and requests relief6 3 which is not identical to the one in the WTO
proceedings, does not preclude the application of lis pendens.
Second, the WTO panel and the ICJ are of the same character regardless
of the quasi-judicial character of the WTO panels.'" Both forums regard
inter-state disputes,' 65 their decisions are binding on the parties,166 and both
the ICJ' 67 and WTO 68 adjudicate on forms of compensation. Therefore, the
Court should dismiss the claim as inadmissible.
b) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMITY
The ICJ has declared that it has the discretion to refrain from giving a
judgement in order to preserve "judicial integrity".169  Accordingly, under
the principle of comity a tribunal can decline to adjudge a dispute where that
159. HRC, Trdbutien v. France, Application 421/1990, 16.3-6.4; Baena Ricardo and others v.
Panama, IACHR, Series C 61, IHRL 1444, 1999. ["Ricardo v. Panama"], 155; Mexico - Tax Measures
on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO, Amicus Curiae Brief by Camara Nacional de las Industrias
Azucarera y Alcoholera-Mexico, 2006, 112.
160. Pauger v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, Application 16717/90, 1995,
p. 7; Ricardo v. Panama, 156.
161. Southern Bluefin Tuna, 154.
162. Application of the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial
discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 14 June 2019, ICJ Rep 2019, ["Qatar v. United
Arab Emirates"], Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cot, 17; Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice
(A&C Black, 2014), ["Kolb"], p. 1202.
163. Compromis,157.
164. Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cot, 119-11.
165. DSU, Art. 1(1).
166. DSU, Arts. 21-22, ICJ Statute, Art. 59; Peter-Tobias Stoll, World Trade Organization,
Dispute Settlement, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2014,167.
167. Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1949, p. 23.
168. DSU, Art. 22(2); United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale
of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO, Decision by the Arbitrator, 2017, WT/DS381/ARB, 17.1; Dispute
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, 22 May 2017, WT/DSB/M/397, 17.24.
169. Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1963, p. 15, ["Northern Cameroons"], p. 29.
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would be unreasonable17 0 or inappropriate."7 ' Parallel proceedings before
two forums is contrary to judicial propriety,' since it might result in
contradictory judgements,1 73 unreasonable cost of proceedings, 7 4 and the
finality of the judgements being questioned.'17 The WTO panel currently
examines the dispute between the parties,1 7 6 thus the Court should declare the
claim inadmissible.
c) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS
Adawa's claim before the Court constitutes an abuse of process. Abuse
of process arises in situations where a State initiates proceedings in an
arbitrary manner.1 77  The rule could be applied in exceptional
circumstances,' 1 such as parallel proceedings before two international
tribunals.179
The Applicant initially commenced proceedings before the WTO.1 80 By
the subsequent submission to the ICJ the Applicant seeks to obtain an "illicit
advantage"18 through a favourable judgement from either fora. Therefore;
170. Northern Cameroons, p. 37; Legality of Use of Force, Separate opinion of Judge Higgins,
¶12.
171. Caroline Henckels, Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO - FTA Nexus: A
Potential Approach for the WTO, European Journal of International Law, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 584; MOX
Plant, ¶28.
172. Andreas Zimmermann and Christian J. Tams (eds.), The Statute of the International Court
of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2019), ["ICJ Statute Commentary"], p. 656.
173. MOXPlant, 128; ICJ Statute Commentary, p. 654.
174. Graewert, p. 311.
175. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Speech to the Sixth Committee ofthe UNGA, 27 October 2000, p.
3; Kolb, pp. 946-947.
176. Compromis, 147.
177. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO, Appellate
Body Report, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, ¶160; Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts
of Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements, Canadian
Yearbook of International Law 2003, p. 100.
178. Immunities and criminal proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Rep 2018, ¶150; Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2019, 1113.
179. Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, Request for the indication of provisional measures by the
United Arab Emirates, 134; Graewert, p. 324; Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping
before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, Cornell International Law
Journal, vol. 42, p. 105.
180. Compromis, 147.
181. Upper Silesia, pp. 37-38.
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the Court should declare the claim inadmissible due to abuse of process.
IH. The imposition of tariffs does not breach the CHC Treaty
a) THE TARIFFS ARE JIUSTIFIED AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT
RASASA'S ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Article 22(b) CHC Treaty allows Rasasa to adopt measures necessary
to protect its essential security interests.'8 2 Essential security interests of the
State encompass armed attack,1 83 public disorder,'M and economic crisis.1 85
After hurricane Makan destroyed 60% of Rasasa's Helian industry crime
rates and unemployment in Rasasa skyrocketed.1 86  Rasasa's devastated
Helian industry' 7as a significant sector of its economy,' 88 constitutes an
essential security interest.
Furthermore, the tariffs are justified as there was a nexus of necessity
between the threat and the measures imposed.1 89 Rassasa's Helian industry
was facing a threat of total collapse due to the fact that Rasasan processors of
Helian hyacinth increasingly began to purchase materials from Adawan
farmers.' 90 The Respondent imposed the tariffs in order to stabilize its
economy.1 9' Thus, the tariffs are consistent with the CHC Treaty.
b) CONSEQUENTLY, ADAWA IS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION
182. CHC Treaty, Art. 22(b).
183. Nicaragua, 1224.
184. Russia - measures concerning traffic in transit case (Ukraine v. Russia), WTO, Panel
Report, 2019, 17.130; Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L. P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID,
ARB/01/3, Award, 2007, ¶331.
185. LG&E Energy Corp., L&E Capital Corp., LG&E international inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID, ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, ¶238; CMS Gas Transmission Company v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID, ARB/01/8, Award 12 May 2005, 1359; Sempra Energy International &
Camuzzi International, S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID, ARB/03/02, Opinion of Anne- Marie Slaughter and
William Burke-White, 130.
186. Compromis, ¶116-17, 27-28.
187. Compromis, 130.
188. Compromis, 12.
189. Nicaragua, ¶¶224, 282; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2003,143.
190. Compromis, 130.
191. Compromis, ¶$33, 44.
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A State would be bound to pay compensation only as a consequence of
an internationally wrongful act.1 92 As Rasasa's tariffs were in compliance
with its obligations under the CHC Treaty,, Adawa is not entitled to
compensation.' 93
D. ADAWA'S ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY
CONSTITUTE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, AND
SHE MUST BE IMMEDIATELY REPATRIATED TO RASASA.
Rasasa submits that Adawa's arrest and detention of Ms. Grey violate
her immunities. Furthermore, this conduct cannot be justified by Adawa's
obligations to cooperate with the ICC. Thus, Darian Grey must be repatriated
to Rasasa.
I. Adawa violated Ms. Grey's immunities by arresting and detaining
her
a) MS. GREY ENJOYS PERSONAL IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND
DETENTION UNDER THE CHC TREATY AND CUSTOMARY LAW
(i) M. Grey enjoys immunity under the CHC Treaty
Ms. Darian Grey enjoys immunity from enforcement actions, such as
arrest and detention,' 94 while exercising her functions'95 as a State
representative to CHC meetings.1 96  Representatives to international
organisations enjoy personal immunity,1 97 which safeguards the independent
exercise of their functions.1 98 Personal immunity covers both official and
192. ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, Supplement No. 10,
UN Doc A/56/10, ["ARSIWA"], Arts. 12, 31, 36.
193. ARSIWA, Arts. 35, 36(2).
194. CHC Treaty, Art. 32.
195. CHC Treaty, Art. 32.
196. Compromis, ¶49.
197. ILC, Seventh report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
Special Rapporteur Concepci6n Escobar Herndndez, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
2019, A/CN.4/729, 145; Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, American Journal of International Law, vol. 98, No. 3, ["Akande"], p. 412; Roger O'Keefe,
International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), ["O'Keefe"], p. 416.
198. Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1, UNTS XVI, Art. 105(2); Applicability ofArticle VI,
Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Natiois, Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Rep 1989,150; Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International
Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975, A/CONF.67/16, ["VCRS"], Preamble, 16; Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946, UNTC 1, p. 15, and 90, p. 327, ["CPIUN"],
Art. 4, Section 14.
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private acts,199 committed prior and during the officials' mandate.200
Furthermore, Ms. Grey's immunity applies during journeys to and from the
places of meeting,201 hence, it covers "the entire period of presence in the
State".202 Therefore, Adawa is barred from arresting and detaining Ms. Grey
during her official visit in Adawa.
(ii) Ms. Grey has immunity under customary law'
Under customary law sitting Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy personal
immunity203 granted to them to ensure the proper functioning of inter-state
relations.204 By virtue of her official capacity,205 Ms. Grey enjoys immunity
from foreign criminal jurisdiction,206 equal to that of diplomatic agents,207
which covers both private and official acts,208 committed prior and during her
time in office.2 09 This immunity extends to enforcement actions undertaken
199. Brownlie, p. 393; Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 585; ILC, Draft Articles on Special Missions with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1967, vol. II, A/6709/Rev.l and Rev.V/Corr.l, p. 361.
200. ILC, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 2013, vol. II, A/68/l0, p. 49, commentary 6.
201. CHC Treaty, Art. 32.
202. ILC, The practice of the UN, the specialized agencies and the IAEA concerning their status,
privileges and immunities, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1967, vol. II,
A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.l, p. 176, 187; Tachiona v. United States, United States, Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, 2004, 386 F.3d 205, 160.
w. Arrest Warrant, 158; ILC, Sixth report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction, Special Rapporteur Concepci6n Escobar Hermdndez, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission 2018, A/CN.4/722, ["Sixth report on immunity"], Draft Article 3; Dapo Akande and
Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, EJIL
vol. 21, 2011, ["Shah"], p. 818; Pinochet case, United Kingdom, House of Lords, Appeal, 1999,
["Pinochet"], 144.
204. Arrest Warrant, Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, 175; Shah,
p. 818.
205. Compromis, 132.
206. Arrest Warrant, 154; Sharon & Yaron case, Belgium, Court of Cessation, 12 February 2003,
P.02.1139.F, p. 7; Pinochet,175.
207. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France),
Judgment, ICJ Rep 2008, p. 177, ["Criminal Matters"], 1174; Arrest Warrant, 151.
208. Arrest Warrant, 155; Sixth report on immunity, Draft Article 4(2); Ramona Pedretti,
Immunity of Heads of State and State Officials for International Crimes, Developments in International
Law, vol. 69, Brill Nijhoff, 2015, ["Pedretti"], p. 25.
209. Arrest Warrant, 155.
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by another State, such as arrest and detention.210 Thus, Adawa cannot arrest
and detain Ms. Grey.
b) ADAWA VIOLATED MS. GREY'S IMMUNITIES BY EXERCISING
DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OVER HER
Ms. Grey's personal immunities as a Minister of Foreign Affairs21' and
a State representative, 212 bar Adawa from exercising domestic criminal
jurisdiction over her including in cases of war crimes.213 Thus, Adawa cannot
exercise any "constraining act of authority"214 such as arrest and detention 21 5
over Ms. Grey. Consequently, the Adawan authorities violated Ms. Grey's
immunities by arresting and detaining her.
II. Adawa's violation of Ms. Grey's immunities cannot be justified
with its cooperation with the ICC
Adawa cannot arrest Mr. Grey pursuant to the ICC's arrest warrant since
ICC does not have jurisdiction over her. In any event, Adawa is bound to
respect Ms. Grey's immunities even when it cooperates with the ICC.
Additionally, there is no customary rule rendering immunities inapplicable in
cases of cooperation with ICC.
a) THE ICC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MS. GREY
(i) The ICC does not have jurisdiction over nationals of non-
parties
Adawa cannot arrest Mr. Grey pursuant to the ICC's arrest warrant as
ICC lacks jurisdiction over her. ICC's jurisdiction does not extend to
210. ILC, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission on the work of its seventieth session, 2018, A/73/10, ["Report 2018"],
1307, 309; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, UNTS 500, p. 91, Art. 29.
211. Arrest Warrant, ¶151, 58; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, South Africa Decision, 2017, ICC-02/05-
01/09-302, ["South Africa Decision"], ¶68.
212. CHC Treaty, Art. 32; VCRS, Arts. 28, 30; CPIUN, Art. 6, Section 11(a).
213. Chamber, 13 March 2001, ILR, vol. 125, p. 508, ¶10; Institut de Droit International, Third
Commission, Resolution on the [mmunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf
of the State in case of International Crimes, 2009, Art. 3(1); O'Keefe, p. 422.
214. Criminal Matters, ¶174; Arrest Warrant, ¶54.
215. South Africa Decision, ¶68; Application for Arrest Warrant Against General Shaul Mofaz,
First instance, UK, Bow Street Magistrates' Court, 2004, 115.
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nationals of non-parties to the Rome Statute,216 such as Rasasa?" Treaties
cannot establish218 or modify219 rights or obligations of non-State parties
without their consent. Furthermore, all international criminal tribunals
operate on the basis of consent.220 Hence, absent Rasasa's consent, its
sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals cannot be abrogated
by the ICC.221 Thus, the ICC does not have jurisdiction to request the arrest
and detention of Ms. Grey's.
(ii) Alternatively, Ms. Grey's immunities are a bar for the
jurisdiction of the ICC
State officials may be deprived of their immunity by the ICC, 222 when
this is established by the Rome Statute 223 or Security Council ["SC"]
resolutions.2 24 However, neither Rasasa is a party to the Rome Statute, 225 nor
has a SC resolution been issued. Furthermore, there is no rule under
customary law which deprives State officials of their personal immunity
before international criminal tribunals. 22 6  Consequently, Ms. Grey's
immunities bar criminal proceedings before the ICC and arrest by Adawa.
216. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, Law
and Contemporary Problems, Duke Law Journal, vol. 61, No. 1, ["Morris"], pp. 26-27, 45, 58; David
Scheffer, International Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, 1999, ["Scheffer"], p. 8; UN, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an ICC, 1998, A/CONF.183/13, vol. 2, ["Rome Conference"], Seventh meeting,
160; Rome Conference, Eight meeting, 1121, 48; Rome Conference, Ninth meeting, 1123-24, 40; Rome
Conference, Twenty ninth meeting, 142; Rome Conference, Thirty third meeting, 141.
217. Compromis,113.
218. VCLT, Art. 34.
219. ILC, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, A/6309/Rev.1, p. 226; Island of Palmas, p. 870; Status of Eastern Carelia
(Advisory Opinion) (1923), PCIJ Ser B No 5, pp. 27-28.
220. Brownlie, p. 431; Morris, p. 37; Scheffer, p. 7.
221. Rome Statute, Preamble, 110, Art. 1; Brownlie, p. 432.
222. Arrest warrant, 161.
223. Rome Statute, Art. 27(2).
224. SC Resolution 1970, 2011, S/RES/1970, ["SC Resolution on Libya"], 114-6; SC Resolution
1953, 2005, S/RES/1953, ["SC Resolution on Sudan"], 112, 6.
225. Compromis, 113.
226. Pedretti, p. 436; Joanne Foakes, The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), ["Foakes"], pp. 197-198; William Schabas, The
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2016),
["Schabas"], p. 600; Akande, p. 421.
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b) ADAWA IS BOUND TO RESPECT MS. GREY'S IMMUNITIES EVEN
WHEN IT COOPERATES WITH THE ICC
Even if Ms. Grey's immunities are not a bar for the jurisdiction of the
ICC, they remain opposable to Adawa.22 7 Adawa's obligation to cooperate
with the ICC does not exempt it from the obligation to respect Ms. Grey's
immunity.22 8 When cooperating with the ICC, States use domestic
enforcement mechanisms.22 9 Thus, by executing the international arrest
warrant,3 0 Adawa exercised its domestic jurisdiction2 3' which is strictly
prohibited. 2
Moreover, Article 98(1) Rome Statute provides that in cases of conflict
between the obligations to cooperate with the ICC and to respect immunity
of foreign officials, the obligation to respect immunity shall prevail.23
Numerous States 23 4 and scholars 23 recognized that pursuant to this rule a
State party cannot arrest officials of non-State parties. Thus, Adawa was
under an obligation to respect Ms. Grey's immunity.
Additionally, Adawa was under an obligation to consult with the ICC
regarding its conflicting obligations.23 This would have relieved the
227. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Request by Professor Paola Gaeta to submit observations on the
merits of the legal questions presented in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's appeal against the Jordan
Decision, 2018, ICC-02/05-01/09-349, ¶5.
228. South Africa Decision, ¶68; Gudnael Mettraux, John Dugard and Max du Plessis, Heads of
State Immunities, International Crimes and President Bashir's Visit to South Africa, International
Criminal Law Review, vol. 18, ["Mettraux, Dugard and Plessis"], p. 603.
229. Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, South Africa,
2002, Section 9(3); Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry and John McManus, The Cooperation of States With the
International Criminal Court, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 25, issue 3, 2001, pp. 770, 772;
Mettraux, Dugard and Plessis, p. 607.
230. Compromis, 1150-51.
231. Report 2018, ¶¶287, 309.
232. Pleadings, (IV.)(A.)(2.).
233. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNTS 2187, p. 3, ["Rome Statute"], Art.
98(1).
234. United Kingdom, International Criminal Court Act, 2001, Chapter 17, Part 2 - Arrest and
Detention, Section 23(2); Republic of Malta, Extradition Act, 1978, Art. 26S(2); Independent State of
Samoa, Act No. 26 on the International Criminal Court, 2007, Art. 32(2); Attorney General et al. v. The
Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya, Court of Appeal at Nairobi, 2018, pp.
17-18.
235. Mettraux, Dugard and Plessis, pp. 611-612; Pedretti, pp. 123-124; Foakes, pp. 200, 202;
Schabas, p. 604.
236. Rome Statute, Art. 86; Schabas, p. 1340.
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Applicant from its duty to cooperate with the ICC. 237 However, no such
consultation was requested from Adawa.
c) THERE IS NO CUSTOMARY RULE RENDERING IMMUNITY
INAPPLICABLE IN CASES OF COOPERATION WITH ICC
A State can cooperate with the ICC in the arrest of foreign State officials
only when both States have waived the immunity of their officials by
ratifying the Rome Statute238 or are bound by SC resolutions.23 9 Neither of
these conditions are present.2 40 Thus, a rule rendering Ms. Grey's immunity
inapplicable in cases of cooperation can become binding upon Rasasa only
under customary law.2 41 Although the ICC declared the existence of such
customary rule in its 2019 Al Bashir judgment, 42 the State practice and
opinio juris are insufficient to support this assertion. Both States parties 243
and non-parties24 to the Rome Statute have rejected that such customary rule
exists. Accordingly, States parties have always refused to arrest indictees of
non-State parties regardless of requests for cooperation.2 4 Therefore, Ms.
Grey's immunities are applicable to Adawa, rendering her arrest and
detention unlawful.
HI. Therefore, Ms. Grey must be immediately repatriated back to
Rasasa
237. Rome Statute, Art. 97; Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Official
Records of the Assembly, First session, Part IIA, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3 and
Corr.], 2002, Rule 195.
238. Rome Statute, Art. 27(1).
239. SC Resolution on Libya, ¶¶4-6; SC Resolution on Sudan, ¶¶2, 6.
240. Compromis, 113.
241. VCLT, Art. 38.
242. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Jordan Appeal, 2019, ICC-02/05-01/09-397, ["Jordan Appeal"],
¶2.
243. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Jordan's Response to observations, ICC-02/05-01/09-368,
19; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, DRC Observations, Annex 2, 2014, ICC-02/05-01/09-190-Anxll-tENG, p.
7.
244. AU, Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal, 2009, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), ¶10.
245. Jordan Appeal, 14; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Djibouti Decision, 2016, ICC-02/05-01/09-
266, 16; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Malawi Decision, 2011, ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr,18.
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By detaining Ms. Grey,24 6 Adawa is in a continuous violation of
international law. 247 Thus, Adawa is under an obligation to cease its
wrongful conduct248 and to make reparation. 249 Presently, the reparation
sought is in the form of restitution, which requires the re-establishment of the
situation which existed before occurrence of the wrongful act.50
Accordingly, Adawa is under an obligation to immediately repatriate Ms.
Grey back to Rasasa.
E. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Rasasa respectfully requests this Court to adjudge and declare that:
I. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Adawa's claims because Adawa is
not a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
II. Rasasa's development and deployment of the WALL along the
border between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent with international law;
III. Adawa's claim that Rasasa's Helian tariffs violate the CHC Treaty
falls outside the Court's jurisdiction or is inadmissible; in the alternative, the
imposition of the tariffs did not violate the CHC Treaty; and
IV. Adawa's arrest and detention of Darian Grey constitute
internationally wrongful acts, and that she must be immediately repatriated
to Rasasa.
246. Compromis, ¶M51-52.
247. ARSI WA, Art. 30.
248. Wall Advisory, ¶151; Nicaragua, 1292(12); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (Iran v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1980, $95(3)(A); Case concerning the
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France), Report of International Arbitration Awards 1990, vol. XX
(Sales No. E/F.93.V.3), p. 266.
249. ARSIWA, Art. 31(1); Nicaragua, ¶149.
250. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2010, ¶273;
ARSIWA, Art. 35.
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